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A History Based Logic for Dynamic Preference
Updates
Can Başkent Guy McCusker
Abstract
History based models suggest a process-based approach to epistemic and tem-
poral reasoning. In this work, we introduce preferences to history based models.
Motivated by game theoretical observations, we discuss how preferences can dy-
namically be updated in history based models. Following, we consider Arrow
Update Logic and Event Calculus, and give history based models for these log-
ics. is allows us to relate dynamic logics of history based models to a broader
framework.
Keywords History based models, preference logic, dynamic logic, arrow update
logic, product update models.
1 Motivation
Formalizing dyadic preferences using Kripke models suggests a one-shot comparison
of agents’ choices. In this seing, there is no past and the choices are local. When it
comes to epistemic and game theoretical situations which require a comparison based
on agents’ previous actions, such models fall short.
ere can be thought of many cases where agents’ preferences today depend on
their behavior in the past. Simply put, most people prefer chocolate to tofu. Yet, if in
the immediate past a person has had a lot of chocolate, his preference for chocolate
today may dier. Moreover, if a person develops an intolerance for dairy, then his
preference for chocolate can change. A new piece of information may cause agents to
update their preferences. Such a situation requires a logic which can describe actions,
events, preferences and their updates.
Well-known Kripke structures tend to formalize preferences using state-based dis-
crete models (Hanson, 2001; van Benthem & Liu, 2007; van Benthem, 2014). Most cer-
tainly, this approach has some advantages: they are easy to work with and portable
to various other modal aitudes. Yet, when it comes to describing preferences that
have some dependency on agents’ behavior in the past, these models may fall short.
For this task, a process based model with the formal strength of expressing temporal
and epistemic aitudes is needed (Sack, 2008; Renne et al., 2016). In this paper, take
a step towards this direction and oer an alternative formalism to describe subjec-
tive preferences based on agents’ behavior in the past, or their histories. As such, our
approach suggests an evolutionary perspective on preferences, immediately allowing
the possibility of updating preferences dynamically, which we describe later on.
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is is where game theoretical motivations become relevant to our discussion for
two main reasons. First, the past behavior or experience of agents aects their future
behavior, hence next moves, and consequently becomes an essential part of strategiz-
ing. erefore, having a model with the syntactic strength to express histories can
be useful for game theoretical applications. Second, preferences (hence strategies)
may depend on agents’ histories. What an agent prefers today may be traced back to
what he preferred yesterday. Such situations can be described by histories which can
express preferences and their revisions. In order to do justice to the subject, in this
work we focus only on the formal aspects of the logics in question and leave the game
theoretical applications to future work.
Logical structures which rely on histories are not obscure, and luckily, we do not
need to look far to nd examples. History based structures, proposed by Parikh and Ra-
manujam (Parikh & Ramanujam, 2003), suggest a formal framework that lies between
process models and temporal epistemic logics. Epistemic and temporal reasoning in
history based models depend on sequences of events, called histories. ese mod-
els have been used to model epistemic messages and communication between agents
using a dynamic logical framework, and deontic obligations (Parikh & Ramanujam,
2003; Pacuit, 2007; Pacuit et al., 2006). Furthermore, they are technically similar to in-
terpreted systems which were suggested to formalize temporal and epistemic aspects
of program runs (Halpern et al., 2004; Pacuit, 2007). Nevertheless, preferences or any
game theoretical formalism have not yet been adequately introduced to history based
structures. is is what we achieve in this work.
is work positions itself within the domain of logic of games and process models.
e literature abounds focusing on logics for games and preferences on one hand,
and logics for processes on the other. (van Benthem, 2014) presented a modern modal
logical approach to the subject. A survey of preference logics is given in (Hanson,
2001). Recently, Osherson and Weinstein proposed a logic of preference based on the
reasons to form preferences (Osherson & Weinstein, 2012). Within the program of
dynamic logic, preference updates have been studied rigorously (van Benthem & Liu,
2007). Nevertheless, these frameworks use Kripke models and suer from the issues
we described earlier.
On the other hand, process models using histories or runs were developed to de-
scribe logics for programs and their epistemologies (Halpern et al., 2004; Fagin et al.,
1995; Fagin et al., 1991; Fagin et al., 1999). Various models for distributed computing
have been used in game theoretical formalism and we refer the reader to a brief sur-
vey for an overview (Halpern, 2008). To the best of our knowledge, such models have
not been extended to express preferences over program runs.
In this work, we extend history based structures by introducing preference modal-
ities — rst a static one followed by a dynamic one. By achieving this, we relate the
subject to the domains of preference logic and distributed multi-agent systems. Aer
noting the fundamental properties of the preference modality, we proceed to describe
various strategies to dynamically update preferences. Following, we focus on some
immediate applications of our models and conclude by pointing out the potential use
of this framework in various game theoretical situations.
e technical work we present has some overreaching game theoretical implica-
tions. In games, strategies are conceived before the play (Hodges, 2013). Any revision
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or update in strategies is essentially considered as part of the strategies. Similarly, con-
sidering the epistemics of games, “the entire stream of beliefs of a player” was summa-
rized in a single entity, which Harsanyi called the player’s type (Brandenburger, 2014;
Harsanyi, 1967). erefore, any potential (epistemic or preference) update is thought
to be contained in the type, which renders dynamic epistemology rather dispensable
for game theory. Preferences are also considered in a similar fashion in traditional
game theory. Any change or update in agents’ subjective preferences are thought to
be already included in the initial preferences of the agents. e current paper, how-
ever, oers various descriptions to update preferences and consequently strategies.
Such a move is helpful to understand the ontology of strategies and whether strategies
should be dened statically or dynamically (Başkent, 2011). erefore, our formalism
allows a nuanced examination of various game theoretical and logical issues, and sets
a formal basis for the analysis of dynamic preferences in games.
*
is paper is organized as follows. First, we introduce the fundamentals of his-
tory based models and observe few modally undenable properties. Following, we
introduce a preference modality to history based models and observe how it com-
mutes with other modal aitudes in our language. Next, we motivate why and how
preferences can be updated, especially for game theoretical reasons. is allows us
to construct a logical structure with preference updates. We show the completeness
and decidability of our system. Consequently, we observe how this new logic relate
to certain other dynamic logics in the literature. is allows us to further explore the
formal qualities of our logic. Finally, we conclude with some remarks on how our
work positions itself in the literature.
2 Basic Logical Structure
Dierent from Kripke models, history based models are constructed by using a given
set of events for (preferably, multiple) agents. Events can be seen as actions or moves
(in a game theoretical context) which take place over time and potentially aect
agents’ knowledge. When a history is considered as a sequence of events, it is impor-
tant to tell apart which events were carried out by which agents, and which agents
can see which events and possess what knowledge.
History based structures are constructed by using a set of events E and a set of
agents A. For each agent i ∈ A, Ei ⊆ E is the set of events which can be performed or
“seen” by agent i . A string h is a history over a set of events E, if it is a nite sequence
of events in E. For a set of events E, E∗ denotes the set of nite strings over E. Similarly,
Eω denotes the set of innite strings over E.
By lowercase leersh,h′, . . . , we denote nite histories from E∗, and by uppercase
leers H ,H ′, . . . , we denote those from E∗ ∪ Eω . A history h is local for agent i , if
h ∈ E∗i . If a history H is of at least length l , and m ≤ l , then let H (m) be the m-th
element of the sequence. e concatenation of nite history h with (possibly innite)
history H will be denoted by hH . Similarly, for a history of length greater than k or
innite, Hk denotes the nite prex of H of length k . If a history H prexes history
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H ′, we write this as H ≤ H ′. A history H ′ is the sub-history of H if each event in H ′
appears in the same order in H , and it is denoted as H ′ v H . For example, ab ≤ abc
but ac v abc .
For any set of histories H , the set FinPre(H) denotes the set of nite prexes of
the histories in H . More precisely, FinPre(H) = {h : h ≤ H ,H ∈ H}. A set of
historiesH is called a protocol if it is closed under prexes, i.e. FinPre(H) ⊆ H .
Now we can discuss temporal and epistemic operators in this framework. Given
an agent i and a global history H , the agent i can only access some of H . For two
histories H ,H ′, if the agent can access the same parts of H and H ′, then H and H ′ are
indistinguishable for i .
Denition 2.1. Let i be an agent, and H be a set of histories. A function λi :
FinPre(H) 7→ E∗i is a locality function for i inH .
ere are various additional properties one may wish to require of locality func-
tions. An agent i’s local clock is consistent with the global clock if, for all H ∈ H and
time points t ,m ∈ N, if t ≤ m, then λi (Ht ) ≤ λi (Hm) (Pacuit, 2007). An agent i’s
locality function is embeddable if, for all H ∈ FinPre(H), λi (H ) v H , that is, all of the
events in λi (H ) occur inH , in the same order (Pacuit, 2007). From this point on, we as-
sume all agents’ local clocks are consistent with the global clock and λi (H ) v H for all
agents i . In other words “agents are not wrong on about the events that they witness”
[ibid]. It is important to notice that the above additional conditions which we im-
posed on history based models are not obvious in Kripke models. erefore, varying
such conditions would permit us to dene dierent temporal concepts of knowledge
and agency. For example, agents’ knowledge which is out-of-sync of the global clock
allows us to trace timed signals, which can be important for various game theoretical
situations.
Denition 2.2. Let i be an agent, and let λi be its locality function. Histories h and
h′ are indistinguishable for agent i , wrien h ∼i h
′
, if and only if h and h′ are nite
histories, and λi (h) = λi (h
′).
For obvious reasons, ∼i is an equivalence relation. us, the epistemic logic of
history based structures is the standard multi-agent epistemic logic S5n .
Given a set of propositional variables P , we dene the syntax of history based
structures in the Backus - Naur form as follows.
φ := p | ¬φ | φ ∧ φ | φ ∨ φ | Kiφ | ©φ | φUφ
where p ∈ P , i ∈ A. e knowledge operator for agent i is denoted by Ki and the
temporal next-time operator is denoted by ©. We call U the until operator. We take
implication→ as an abbreviation in the usual sense. Valuation function V is dened
as V : P 7→ ℘(FinPre(H)).
A tupleM = (E,H ,A, E1, . . . , En , λ1, . . . , λn ,V ) is a history-based temporal-epistemic
model, or a history-basedmodel for short, where E is a global set of events,H ⊆ E∗∪Eω
is a protocol, A is a set of agents, Ei and λi are agent i’s local event set and locality
function respectively, and V is a valuation function as dened earlier.
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Truth in history based models is dened inductively as follows. We dene seman-
tics for innite histories (Pacuit, 2007)
1
.
H , t |=M p i Ht ∈ V (p),
H , t |=M ¬φ i H , t 6 |=M φ,
H , t |=M φ ∧ψ i H , t |=M φ and H , t |=M ψ ,
H , t |=M φ ∨ψ i H , t |=M φ or H , t |=M ψ ,
H , t |=M ©φ i H , t + 1 |=M φ,
H , t |=M Kiφ i for all H
′ ∈ H , Ht∼iH
′
t implies H
′, t |=M φ,
H , t |=M φUψ i there exists k ≥ t such that H ,k |=M ψ and,
for all l , t ≤ l < k implies H , l |=M φ.
e dual of the epistemic modality is denoted with Li and dened in the usual way.
e expressionM |= φ denotes the truth ofφ in a history based model M , independent
from the current history and time-stamp. When it is clear from the context, we will
omit the subscript M for the model.
e axioms for history based models are given in the following (Parikh & Ramanu-
jam, 2003; Halpern et al., 2004).
• All tautologies of propositional logic,
• Ki (φ → ψ ) → (Kiφ → Kiψ ),
• Kiφ → φ ∧ KiKiφ,
• ¬Kiφ → Ki¬Kiφ,
• ©(φ → ψ ) → (©φ → ©ψ ),
• ©¬φ ↔ ¬© φ,
• φUψ ↔ ψ ∨ (φ ∧ ©(φUψ )).
e rules of inference are modus ponens, and normalization for all three modali-
ties:
• ` φ,φ → ψ ∴ ` ψ ,
• ` φ ∴ ` Kiφ,
• ` φ ∴ ` ©φ,
• ` φ → (¬ψ ∧ ©φ) ∴ ` φ → ¬(φUψ ).
1
is is important in order to prevent some technical problems such as evaluating the truth of a formula
at time point n, for example, when the nite history h is shorter than n. We are thankful to the anonymous
referee for pointing this out.
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For the completeness and complexity results of this system we refer the reader to
(Fagin et al., 1995; Halpern et al., 2004; Pacuit, 2007). e standard completeness proof
for the systems of epistemic and temporal systems proceed by forming consistent
closure sets, very much similar to the procedural completeness proofs of modal logic.
Such systems are easy to translate to history based models, as observed by Pacuit,
proving their completeness.
History based models combine epistemic and temporal modalities in a complex
way. What properties can or cannot be dened using the syntax of history based
structures is a meaningful question. In order to answer this question, we need to
dene bisimulations.
Denition 2.3. For history based models M,M ′, and history-time pairsH , t in M and
H ′, t ′ in M ′, a bisimulation ./ between H , t and H ′, t ′ is a tuple ./ = (./0, ./1) where
./0 is a binary relation between the history-time pairs in M and M
′
and ./1 is a binary
relation between the pairs of history-time pairs in M and M ′ such that
Propositional base case:
• If H , t ./0 H
′, t ′, then H , t and H ′, t ′ satisfy the same propositional variables,
Temporal forth case:
• IfH , t ./0 H
′, t ′ and t < u, then there isu ′ in M ′ such that t ′ < u ′, H ,u ./0 H
′,u ′
and (H , t), (H ,u) ./1 (H
′, t ′), (H ′,u ′),
• If (H , t), (H ,u) ./1 (H
′, t ′), (H ′,u ′) and if there is v ′ with t ′ < v ′ < u ′, then
there exists v such that t < v < u and H ,v ./0 H
′,v ′,
Temporal back case:
• If H , t ./0 H
′, t ′ and t ′ < u ′, then there is u in M such that t < u, H ,u ./0 H
′,u ′
and (H , t), (H ,u) ./1 (H
′, t ′), (H ′,u ′),
• If (H , t), (H ,u) ./1 (H
′, t ′), (H ′,u ′) and if there is v with t < v < u, then there
exists v ′ such that t ′ < v ′ < u ′ and H ,v ./0 H
′,v ′,
Epistemic forth case:
• If H , t ./0 H
′, t ′ and Ht∼iKl , then there is K
′, l ′ in M ′ such that K , l ./0 K
′, l ′
and H ′t ′∼iK
′
l ′ ,
Epistemic back case:
• If H , t ./0 H
′, t ′ and H ′t ′∼iKl ′ , then there is K , l in M such that K , l ./0 K
′, l ′ and
Ht∼iKl ,
In the above denition, the interval bisimulations dened for the temporal cases
are needed for the temporal until modality, as the until modality is essentially an
interval process equivalence. Based on this denition, we give the following theorem.
eorem 2.4. For history based models M,M ′, and history-time pairs H , t in M and
H ′, t ′ inM ′, if H , t ./ H ′, t ′, then they satisfy the same formula.
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Proof. For the standard epistemic case see (Blackburn et al., 2001), for the temporal
case see (Kurtonina & de Rijke, 1997). 
We now observe that some properties of histories are not (modally) denable.
Proposition 2.5. e length of histories is not modally denable.
Corollary 2.6. e niteness of histories is not modally denable.
e proof of the above proposition uses bisimulations and the fact that these mod-
els are not backward-looking. It is possible to construct two bisimilar history-time
pairs, one of length n and the other of length n + k for some k , 0. An easy way to
achieve this is to prex a history of length n with strings of length k . In that case, for
instance, we may have bisimilar history-time pairs of abc, 2 ./ xxabc, 4 with dierent
length - provided that the epistemic relation is dened respecting the bisimulation.
Henceforth, if there was a formula dening the length of histories, then this formula
must have been preserved under bisimulations. However, this is not possible as the
length of the history abc is strictly less than that of xxabc .
e above results present a limitation on history based models. For example, the
evolutionary aspects of knowledge acquisition cannot be quantitatively described as
the length of histories are not modally denable. Such issues can be important in
certain game theoretical situations.
3 Preferences in History Based Models
One of the main contributions of this paper is to introduce subjective preferences
to history based models with game theoretical applications in mind. is will allow
us to describe some basic game theoretical situations using history based models.
Furthermore, we will also suggest various ways to update such subjective preferences.
For an agent i , and possibly innite histories H ,H ′, the expression H i H
′
de-
notes that “the agent i (weakly) prefersH ′ toH”. e preference relation will be taken
as a pre-order satisfying reexivity and transitivity (not necessarily total) (van Ben-
them, 2014; Hanson, 2001). If H i H
′
and H ′ i H , we denote it by H ≈i H
′
.
e strong preference relation is denoted by ≺i for agent i , and dened as expected:
H ≺i H
′
i H i H
′
and H , H ′.
In order to describe preferences in a modal language, we augment the syntax of
the logic of history based structures with a modal operator ^i . In this context ^iφ
reads that there is a history which is at least as good as the current one and satises
φ for agent i . e syntax of history based preferences L is given as follows.
φ := p | ¬φ | φ ∧ φ | φ ∨ φ | Kiφ | ©φ | φUφ | ^iφ
where p ∈ P , i ∈ A. We take implication→ as an abbreviation in the usual sense.
e semantics for the preference modality is given as follows.
H , t |= ^iφ i ∃H ′.H i H ′ and H ′, t |= φ
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e dual of the preference modality is denoted by i and dened in the usual
sense. Formally, history based preference model is a tuple
M = (E,H ,A, E1, . . . , En , λ1, . . . , λn , 1, . . . , n ,V )
where i is the preference comparison order for agent i and the rest is as before.
As we underlined, this formalism compares histories as opposed to propositions.
However, it is possible to express preferences over propositions by referring to the
histories which satisfy them. e formula M |= φ → ^iψ denotes that the agent i
weakly prefers ψ to φ in model M . In other words, each φ has an alternative history
which is at least as preferable as the current one and satises ψ , thus ψ is weakly
preferred to φ.
We take the preference modality as S4 with the expected rule of inference - that
is necessitation. For the completeness of our treatment, the axiomatization of history
based preference logic is given as follows.
• All tautologies of propositional logic,
• Ki (φ → ψ ) → (Kiφ → Kiψ ),
• Kiφ → φ ∧ KiKiφ,
• ¬Kiφ → Ki¬Kiφ,
• i (φ → ψ ) → (iφ → iψ ),
• iφ → φ,
• iφ → iiφ,
• ©(φ → ψ ) → (©φ → ©ψ ),
• ©¬φ ↔ ¬© φ,
• φUψ ↔ ψ ∨ (φ ∧ ©(φUψ )).
e rules of inference are modus ponens, and necessitation for all three modalities:
• ` φ,φ → ψ ∴ ` ψ ,
• ` φ ∴ ` Kiφ,
• ` φ ∴ ` iφ
• ` φ ∴ ` ©φ,
• ` φ → (¬ψ ∧ ©φ) ∴ ` φ → ¬(φUψ ).
We call the logic of history based structures with preferences HBPL aer history
based preference logic.
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3.1 Expressive Power
In what follows, we introduce additional axioms to express various epistemic and
strategic situations in HBPL. ey give a direct illustration for HBPL’s potential use
in game theoretical formalism.
Connectedness of Preferences e connectedness property for the preference re-
lation suggests that any two histories are comparable. e corresponding relational
formula is given as ∀H ,H ′.H i H ′ ∨H ′ i H . e corresponding modal axiom is as
follows: i (ip → q)∨i (iq → p). is renders the frame with preference modality
as a total pre-order. A total pre-order of preferences over histories equips players with
the game theoretical strength to compare each and every history. Philosophically, this
allows us to discuss counterfactual reasoning in games, which falls outside the scope
of the current paper.
Epistemic Perfect Recall Agents with perfect recall retain knowledge once they
acquire it. e standard axiom for this property is given as follows: Ki©φ → ©Kiφ.
It is rather easy to show that this axiom is valid in HBPL. Given an arbitrary history
H and a time-stamp t , we start with assuming H , t |= Ki©φ. Our aim is to show that
©Kiφ holds at H , t . Now, by denition, ∀H ′.(H∼iH ′ → H ′, t |= ©φ). Unfolding the
temporal modality gives ∀H ′.(H∼iH ′ → H ′, t + 1 |= φ). Now, we can fold back, but
this time starting with the epistemic modality. By denition, we rst obtainH , t +1 |=
Kiφ, which produces H , t |= ©Kiφ. us, Ki©φ → ©Kiφ is valid in HBPL.2
e satisfaction of epistemic perfect recall perhaps justies the reason why we call
sequences of events “histories” (as opposed to runs or traces). From a philosophical
angle, it suggests a strong epistemic restriction on the potential class of games to
which history based models might be applicable.
Preferential Perfectness By preferential perfectness, we mean that agents do not
change their preferences in time. Consider the scheme i©φ → ©iφ. It is also
easy to show that this scheme is valid in HBPL. Similar to Perfect Recall, Preferential
Perfectness suggests that once acquired preferences do not change. is suggests
that, if necessary, they can only be revised at the level of the model. We will use this
observation to motivate a dynamic approach to preference change.
EpistemicRationality By a slight abuse of terminology we call the formula^iKiφ →
Ki^iφ the Church-Rosser Property. e HBPL frames which satisfy the Property enjoy
the following relational condition:
∀H ′H ′′.(H i H ′ ∧ H ∼i H ′′) → ∃J .(H ′ ∼i J ∧ H ′′ i J )
In the following we show that the above relational (frame) condition corresponds to
the formula ^iKiφ → Ki^iφ in history-based models.
2
However, the axiom Ki©φ → ©Kiφ is not sucient to establish the completeness of frames with
respect to perfect recall (van der Meyden & shu Wong, 2003; van der Meyden, 1994). e additional axiom
required for this task is a complicated one:
Kiφ1 ∧ ©(Kiφ2 ∧ ¬Kiφ3) → ¬Ki¬((Kiφ1)U ((Kiφ2)U¬φ3)).
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Let the frame condition satised in history-based frames. For an arbitrary history-
time pair H , t , we assume H , t |= ^iKiφ. We will show that H , t |= Ki^iφ by reductio.
First, by the assumption, there exists a historyH ′ such thatH i H
′
withH ′, t |= Kiφ.
en, by denition, for all J with H ′ ∼i J , we have J , t |= φ. Now, in order to obtain
a contradiction, assume H , t |= ¬Ki^iφ. By denition, this is equivalent to H , t |=
Lii¬φ. en, there exists H
′′
such that H ∼i H
′′
with H ′′, t |= i¬φ. Now, we have
H i H
′
and H ∼i H
′′
. By the Church-Rosser property, there existsW with H ′ ∼i W
and H ′′  W . Now, for all J ′ with H ′′ i J , we have J
′, t |= ¬φ. is is a universal
statement for all J ′′ ranging over H ′′ i J . us, it applies to W . us, W , t |= ¬φ.
Similarly, we had for all J with H ′ ∼i J that J , t |= φ. is is a universal statement as
well which can be instantiated withW . us,W , t |= φ. is is a contradiction. us,
H , t |= Ki^iφ, yielding H , t |= ^iKiφ → Ki^iφ.
e converse direction is similar. Assume, H , t |= ^iKiφ → Ki^iφ for arbitrary
H , t and φ. Now, let H i H
′
and H ∼i H
′′
. We will establish by reductio that
there exists a history J with the desired property. So let us assume that there is no
J with H ′ ∼i J and H
′′ i J . e Church-Rosser formula is a frame-property, thus
it is satised in every valuation. Let us pick a simple one. For this, we start with
assuming thatφ is a propositional variable andH , t |= ^iKiφ. us, for someH i H
′
,
we have H ′, t |= Kiφ. us, for all X with H
′ ∼i X , we have X , t |= φ. Based on
this observation, we dene a minimal valuation V for the propositional variable φ
as follows: V (φ) : {H , t : H ′ ∼i H }. Now, since we had H ∼i H
′′
and H , t |=
Ki^iφ, we observe that H
′′, t |= ^iφ. us, we need a history J
′
with H ′′ i J
′
and,
by the denition of the minimal valuation for φ, H ′ ∼i J
′
. However, by our initial
assumption, there is no such J ′. us, H ′′, t |= ^iφ cannot be true. Contradiction
shows that there is such a history J with H ′ ∼i J and H
′′ i J .
e Church-Rosser Property suggests that if, at a beer history, an agent knows
φ, then the agent knows that at a beer history φ is satised. is has some potential
applications in games. For example, elimination of strictly dominated strategies is a
solution concept in game theory which works irrespective of the order of elimination.
Having Church-Rosser property satised in epistemic game models suggests that the
order of eliminating the strictly dominated strategies does not maer (Leyton-Brown
& Shoham, 2008). is is how history models directly relate to game theoretical rea-
soning.
It is also easy to see the validities of various some other modal formulas, includ-
ing iKi©φ → ©iKiφ or Kii©φ → ©Kiiφ. Similarly, various commutativity
properties of the modalities, such as KiKjφ ↔ KjKiφ, can be studied. We leave them
to the reader.
For the completeness and decidability of HPBL, we refer the reader to (Halpern
et al., 2004; Halpern & Vardi, 1989) where the completeness of epistemic-temporal
logics with runs are given by using maximal consistent sets in the usual sense within
a quite involved framework. ese results carry over directly to HBPL for two rea-
sons. First, for the preference modality, we have not introduced any interaction axiom
between the preference modality and any other modality. Second, epistemic modality
is known to be S5 and stronger than the preference modality which is taken as S4.
en, HBPL can be seen as a fusion of an (epistemically) S5 history based temporal-
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Figure 1: Bale of the Sexes in extensive normal form (le) and its epistemic indistin-
guishability relation. e solid line denes the knowledge set of Player A whereas the
dashed line denes that of B.
epistemic logic and an S4 preference logic (Gabbay et al., 2003). Based on these ob-
servations and (Halpern et al., 2004; Halpern & Vardi, 1989), the completeness and
decidability of HBPL follow.
eorem 3.1. HBPL is sound and complete with respect to the axiomatization given.
eorem 3.2. HBPL is decidable.
4 Dynamic Preference Update on Histories
ere can be suggested various reasons as to why players may need to update their
preferences in games. ey may receive a new piece of information, improve their
skills, strategize, or simply make mistakes or cheat. Particularly, in some incomplete
information games rational players may be forced to revise their preferences when a
new piece of information is introduced. Let us now see a game theoretical example
to illustrate our perspective.
We start by considering a variation of Bale of the Sexes given in Figure 1. In
this coordination game, two players A and B want to aend the same event together.
ey have two choices: going to a cooking class (c) or dancing (d). Player A prefers
the cooking class, whereas Player B prefers dancing. But, both prefer aending the
same activity rather than dierent ones. A game theoretical conundrum occurs, if we
are in the situation that A and B made plans to meet up to aend an event together,
but they cannot remember where. If they cannot communicate, what should they do?
We assume that each agent has a preference over her preferred activity and they
are commied to make the best move based on their preferences. PlayerAwants to go
to the cooking class, B wants to go dancing. Since there is no communication, they do
not know each other’s move. But, they would cooperate if they learned (in a one-way
communication) how the other would act.
We model the game using preferences. As players have symmetric preferences,
let us focus only on Player A’s (weak) preferences for simplicity. For A, we have
cd A dc A dd A cc
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and
cd ∼A cc dd ∼A dc.
As we mentioned, A’s incentive is to go to cooking class. But, the game is an
imperfect information game. Let us assume that A learns that B is on her way to
dancing, aer a common friend tells her. is eliminates A’s preference of going to
cooking class. en, A’s highest preference becomes going dancing.
When A learns about B’s d move, she revises her preferences to leave only
cd A dd.
In this case, her best move becomes d. She no longer prefers going to cooking class
over dancing, consequently the preference relation between them is eliminated. Fur-
thermore, for A the epistemic distinguishabilities between cd and cc, and dd and dc
are removed, as A now knows the current state of the game. e alternative histories,
cc and dc, however, are kept in the model because they may be needed to express
various other epistemic situations. In our case, since B may not know that A knows
about B’s move, we need to keep cc and dc in the model for a complete epistemic
description of the situation.
In our model, preference elimination is controlled by formulas in the language. For
example, aer learning aboutB’s move, the preference relation dd A cc is eliminated.
Because at history dd (at the appropriate time-point), it is true that B makes a d move,
whereas at cc (again, at the appropriate time-point), it is not the case that B makes a
d move. Hence, the fact that “B makes a d move” controls the preference update.
We can generalize from this example. First, we choose to eliminate the preference
relations that are made redundant, but keep those histories which were used to dene
said preferences. One reason is that the update may not be common knowledge and
some agents may still consider those histories epistemically plausible. To the best of
our knowledge, such preference models have always used Kripkean models to give
an account of dynamic preference updates. In this work, we suggest a history-based
model for preference updates to take advantage of its applicability to game theoretical
situations. Another advantage of using HBPL for game theoretical reasoning is that it
admits native tools to express turns and move orders, denoted by the temporal time-
stamp. In this work, we will not heavily focus on the temporal aspects of the games,
but rather discuss the preference dynamics.
Before describing the formal details of dynamic preference updates in history
based models, it is important to note that the syntax of HBPL is strong enough to
express saddle points and game equilibria in certain cases. In the Bale of Sexes ex-
ample, for instance, the game admits two Nash equilibria: cc and dd (Osborne &
Rubinstein, 1994). ese histories satisfy certain modal logical properties: they are
strictly preferred and there is no strictly beer move for the player that his oppo-
nent cannot distinguish epistemically. erefore, we have cc, 2 |= ¬〈≺i ∩ ∼−i 〉> and
dd, 2 |= ¬〈≺i ∩ ∼−i 〉>, where ≺i is the strict preference subrelation of i , −i is the
opponent of i , and 〈R〉 is the auxiliary modality dened using the relation R. Such a
characterization is straightforward for simple games like Bale of Sexes or Prisoner’s
Dilemma where information sets are easy to handle and pure strategy equilibria exist.
We leave such discussions for future work.
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Now, we formally introduce preference updates to history based models.
Following the standard methodology, the preference update will be carried out by
a distinguishing formula φ. e formula φ is a “distinguishing formula” for H , t and
H ′, t , if H , t |= φ but H ′, t |= ¬φ. For a given H i H
′
, the purpose of a preference
update by a distinguishing formula φ is to eliminate H i H
′
from the preference
relation so that H i H
′
is obtained. We denote the updated preference relation for
agent i by ∗i . Syntactically, we denote the preference update by φ with [φ!]. In the
above example, “B makes a d move” acts as the distinguishing formula.
Given a HBPL model M = (E,H ,A, {Ei }i ∈A, {λi }i ∈A, {i }i ∈A,V ), the preference
update model M!φ with respect to the distinguishing formula φ is a tuple
M!φ = (E,H ,A, {Ei }i ∈A, {λi }i ∈A, {i }i ∈A, {∗i }i ∈A,V )
where the updated preference orders ∗i are dened as
∗i := i \ {(H ,H
′) : H , t |=M φ and H
′, t |=M ¬φ for any t}.
In this formalism, we note that preference updates are independent from the clock,
depending only on the distinguishing formulas.
e language L∗ of this system is specied as follows for p ∈ P , i ∈ A:
φ := p | ¬φ | φ ∧ φ | φ ∨ φ | Kiφ | ©φ | φUφ | ^iφ | [!φ]φ
As before, we take implication→ as an abbreviation.
Given a model M and a distinguishing formula φ, the semantics of the preference
update modality is given as follows.
H , t |=M [φ!]ψ i H , t |=M !φ ψ
e dual of the [·!] modality is denoted with 〈·!〉 and dened in the usual sense.
It is now important to observe that ∗i is indeed a preference order.
Lemma 4.1. Let i be a preference order. For a given φ, the updated relation ∗i with
respect to the distinguishing formula φ is also a preference order.
Proof. Let i be a preference order. Let φ be the distinguishing formula with which
we will update the preference relation.
e updated preference ∗i is reexive since the model we have is not inconsistent
and no history H satises a contradictory formula. erefore, no tuple (H ,H ) can be
removed from i , which is known to be reexive. us, 
∗
i is reexive as well.
In order to show the transitivity of ∗i , let us consider H 
∗
i H
′ ∗i H
′′
where
H ∗i H
′′
. By denition, we have H i H
′ i H
′′
and consequently H i H
′′
. en,
since we assumed that H ∗i H
′′
for the distinguishing formula φ, we have H , t |= φ
and H ′′, t |= ¬φ. en, for H ′, t we have two options. It either satises φ or ¬φ. If
H ′, t |= φ, then φ is the distinguishing formula for the tuples H ′, t and H ′′, t , resulting
in the elimination of H ′ ∗i H
′′
. Otherwise, if H ′, t |= ¬φ, then, similarly φ acts as
the distinguishing formula for the tuples H , t and H ′, t , resulting in the elimination of
H ∗i H
′
. In either case, we obtain a contradiction. Consequently, H ∗i H
′′
. us, ∗i
is transitive.
Hence, ∗i is a preference order. 
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e additional set of axioms for the dynamic preference modality is given as fol-
lows.
1. [φ!]p ↔ p
2. [φ!]¬ψ ↔ ¬[φ!]ψ
3. [φ!](ψ ∧ χ ) ↔ [φ!]ψ ∧ [φ!]χ
4. [φ!](ψ ∨ χ ) ↔ [φ!]ψ ∨ [φ!]χ
5. [φ!]Kiψ ↔ Ki [φ!]ψ
6. [φ!]©ψ ↔ ©[φ!]ψ
7. [φ!](ψU χ ) ↔ ([φ!]ψ )U ([φ!]χ )
8. [φ!]^iψ ↔ (¬φ ∧ ^i [φ!]ψ ) ∨ ^i (φ ∧ [φ!]ψ )
e additional proof rule required for the dynamic modality is necessitation, de-
ned in the usual sense: ` ψ ∴ ` [φ!]ψ . We call this system HBPL*.
e axioms of HBPL* are sound. e soundness proof is a standard induction on
the length of the formulas, hence skipped.
Lemma 4.2. e axioms of HBPL* are sound.
Based on this axiomatization, it is easy to see that [·!] is self-dual. In order to see
this, consider [φ!]¬ψ . By Axiom 2 above, it is equivalent to ¬[φ!]ψ . Dually, this equals
to 〈φ!〉¬ψ . e choice of φ andψ was arbitrary, therefore [φ!]ψ ≡ 〈φ!〉ψ .
e above axioms system acts as a set of reduction functions fromHBPL* toHBPL,
reducing the complexity of dynamic preference formulas to the formulas in the lan-
guage of HBPL.
e Boolean cases for this reduction are immediate. Let us consider the epistemic
case in a given model M . We start with H , t |=M [φ!]Kiψ .
H , t |=M [φ!]Kiψ i H , t |=M !φ Kiψ
i ∀H ′.Ht ∼i H ′t ,H ′, t |=M !φ ψ
i ∀H ′.Ht ∼i H ′t ,H ′, t |=M [φ!]ψ
i H , t |=M Ki [φ!]ψ
e above argument is sound as the preference updates do not aect the epistemic
accessibility relations. e proof of soundness for the reduction axiom for the next-
time operator is along the same lines, hence skipped. e until modality is intriguing.
We start with H , t |=M [φ!](ψU χ ).
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H , t |=M [φ!](ψU χ ) i H , t |=M !φ ψU χ
i ∃k ≥ t . H ,k |=M !φ χ and
∀l . t ≤ l < k, H , l |=M !φ ψ
i ∃k ≥ t . H ,k |=M [φ!]χ and
∀l . t ≤ l < k, H , l |=M [φ!]ψ
i H , t |=M ([φ!]ψ )U ([φ!]χ )
Next, let us consider the axiom for reducing the preference modality. We start with
H , t |=M [φ!]^iψ . Aer taking φ as a distinguishing formula, we have two options:
the current history does not satisfy the distinguishing formula φ or the accessible
histories do not satisfy ¬φ. We consider both cases separately.
H , t |=M [φ!]^iψ i H , t |=M !φ ^iψ
(Case 1: φ is not satised at the current state)
i H , t |=M !φ ^iψ and H , t |=M ¬φ
i H , t |=M ¬φ and ∃H ′.H i H ′ such that
H ′, t |=M !φ ψ
i H , t |=M ¬φ and H
′, t |=M [φ!]ψ f orH i H
′
i H , t |=M ¬φ and H , t |=M ^i [φ!]ψ
i H , t |=M ¬φ ∧ ^i [φ!]ψ
(Case 2: ¬φ is not satised at accessible histories)
i H ′, t |=M !φ ψ for H i H
′
(as H ′ cannot satisfy ¬φ in M)
i H ′, t |=M !φ ψ for H i H
′
and H ′, t |=M φ
i H ′, t |=M [φ!]ψ and H
′, t |=M φ for H i H
′
i H ′, t |=M [φ!]ψ ∧ φ for H i H
′
i H , t |=M ^i (φ ∧ [φ!]ψ )
(combining Cases 1 and 2 disjunctively:)
i H , t |=M (¬φ ∧ ^i [φ!]ψ ) ∨ ^i (φ ∧ [φ!]ψ )
It is important to note that for the case of consecutive updates [φ!][ψ !]χ , we do
not have a general reduction axiom. Yet, together with the necessitation rule for [·!],
we still have a complete axiom system
3
, as we will now show.
We call a formula φ update-free if it does not contain any subformula with the
preference update modality [·!]. Our completeness argument rests on a rewriting of
any formula to a logically equivalent update-free formula.
3
For a detailed exposition of such reductions in the context of dynamic epistemic logic, we refer the
reader to (Moss, 2015).
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Lemma 4.3. Every formula inHBPL* can be rewrien as a logically equivalent update-
free formula.
Proof. e argument is based on a translation t on the formulas of HBPL* which will
mimick the axioms of HBPL* to “simplify” the complex formulas.
By the soundness of the necessitation rule for [·!], we can translate formulas with
consecutive updates of type [φ!][ψ !]χ from “inside out” (Moss, 2015). We dene the
translation function t as follows.
t(p) = p
t(¬φ) = ¬t(φ)
t(φ ∧ψ ) = t(φ) ∧ t(ψ )
t(φ ∨ψ ) = t(φ) ∨ t(ψ )
t(Kiφ) = Kit(φ)
t(^iφ) = ^it(φ)
t(©φ) = ©t(φ)
t(φUψ ) = t(φ)Ut(ψ )
t([φ!]p) = p
t([φ!]¬ψ ) = ¬t([φ!]ψ )
t([φ!](ψ ∧ χ )) = t([φ!]ψ ) ∧ t([φ!]χ )
t([φ!](ψ ∨ χ )) = t([φ!]ψ ) ∨ t([φ!]χ )
t([φ!]Kiψ ) = Kit([φ!]ψ )
t([φ!]©ψ ) = ©t([φ!]ψ )
t([φ!](ψU χ )) = t([φ!]ψ )Ut([φ!]χ )
t([φ!]^iψ ) = (¬φ ∧ ^it([φ!]ψ )) ∨ ^i (φ ∧ t([φ!]ψ ))
t([φ!][ψ !]χ ) = t([φ!]t([ψ !]χ ))
We note that the form of the nal case of this denition means that t is not dened
by straightforward structural induction. Nevertheless, the function t can be shown to
be well-dened by lexicographic induction on the number of updates and the length
of the formula. Alternatively, the translation may be formulated by means of two in-
ductively dened functions, mimicking the lexicographic induction; see the appendix
for details.
Let us argue here how the translation function works for consecutive updates.
Consider |= χ . By soundness of the necessitation rule, |= [ψ !]χ . By the induction hy-
pothesis, |= t([ψ !]χ ) is an update-free formula. By another application of the sound-
ness of the necessitation rule, we obtain |= [φ!]t([ψ !]χ ) where t([ψ !]χ ) is update-free.
Another application of the t function yields t([φ!][ψ !]χ ) = t([φ!]t([ψ !]χ )). 
e completeness of HBPL* follows.
eorem 4.4. HBPL* is complete with respect to the axiomatization given.
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Proof. We will prove that for any φ ∈ L∗, it follows that ` φ ↔ t(φ).
e argument is by lexicographic induction on the number of updates and the
complexity of φ. e cases for the Booleans, (static) modals and the update operator
are self-evident using proof rules of modal and propositional logic and the induction
hypothesis. In what follows, we prove the theorem for φ = [α !][β!]γ .
e induction hypothesis says that for all ψ with fewer number of updates than
φ, we have ` ψ ↔ t(ψ ). Now, let us consider the case φ = [α !][β!]γ .
1. ` [β!]γ ↔ t([β!]γ )
2. ` [α !][β!]γ ↔ [α !]t([β!]γ )
3. ` [α !]t([β!]γ ) ↔ t([α !]t([β!]γ ))
4. ` [α !][β!]γ ↔ t([α !]t([β!]γ ))
A brief narration of the proof is in order. We rst start with considering an instance of
the induction hypothesis for the formula [β!]γ . en, by the necessitation with [α !],
we obtain Line 2. Now, it is possible to apply the induction hypothesis to [α !]t([β!]γ )
since it has fewer updates than [α !][β!]γ . Next, we obtain Line 3 by the induction hy-
pothesis with the formula [α !]t([β!]γ ). Lines 2 and 3 produce Line 4 by propositional
logic. Since t([φ!][ψ !]χ ) = t([φ!]t([ψ !]χ )) by denition, we conclude the expected
result: ` [α !][β!]γ ↔ t([α !][β!]γ ). 
An immediate by-product of the above result is the decidability of HBPL*.
eorem 4.5. HBPL* is decidable.
Proof. e proof follows from eorems 3.2 and 4.4. 
e logic HBPL* presents a logical characterization of dynamic preference up-
dates. A potential application of HBPL* is to analyze game theoretical equilibria in
this context. Furthermore, considering the translation between history based mod-
els and interpreted systems (Pacuit, 2007), our results can be applied to interpreted
systems where program runs with dynamic preferences can be constructed.
5 Further Applications
In what follows, we relate HBPL* to some other well-known dynamic systems and ex-
amine howHBPL* may position itself within the domain of dynamic epistemic/temporal
logics. We start with Arrow Update Logic and then consider an event calculus to sug-
gest a product update for HBPL*.
5.1 Arrow Update Logic and Dynamic Preference Updates in
History Based Models
A recent work on dynamic epistemic logic suggests an alternative formalism to up-
date models (Kooi & Renne, 2011). In this method, called “arrow updates”, relational
arrows are eliminated without eliminating the states. Arrow Update Logic (AUL, for
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short) discusses this methodology in a dynamic epistemic framework and compares it
to other dynamic epistemic paradigms. Considering the similarities in the methodolo-
gies of both arrow update models and history based models, we carry the discussion
over to dynamic preference logic and give a history based model for AUL. is in-
troduces histories into AUL, and advances our study of dynamic preference updates
in history based models. As such, we broaden our formal toolkit to discuss game
theoretical preferences.
e syntax of AUL is based on the standard language of modal logic augmented
by the arrow update modality [U ]. e arrow update modality depends on a set U ,
which is constructed as follows, for i ∈ A:
U ::= (φ, i,φ) | (φ, i,φ) ∪U
e set U is called an “arrow specication”. In our context it denotes which prefer-
ences (that is relational arrows for the preferences) will be kept in the model aer an
update [U ]. It is important to notice that the arrow specication sets does not have
any semantic closure condition.
Let us now interpret AUL in history based models. Given a HBPL model M =
(E,H ,A, {Ei }i ∈A, {λi }i ∈A, {i }i ∈A,V ), we dene an arrow update model
M×U = {E×,H×,A×, {E×i }i ∈A, {λ
×
i }i ∈A, {
×
i }i ∈A,V
×)
with respect to a set of arrow specications U as follows, for i ∈ A and for any t .
E× := E
H× := H
λ×i := λi
×i := {(H ,H
′) ∈ i | ∀t .∃(φ, i,φ ′) ∈ U : H , t |=M φ and H ′, t |=M φ ′}
E×i := Ei
A× := A
V × := V
If the arrow specication setU that is used to arrow-update the preference relation i
needs to be made explicit, we will use the notation ×i [U ]. Furthermore, the quanti-
cation on the time stamp t suggests that the arrow update is carried out over all time
points. e alternative quantication (that is ∃(φ, i,φ ′).∀t ) would suggest that once
the arrow specication is xed, it does not change over time. is is a very strong ap-
proach to dynamic epistemology and does not address our concerns. In what follows,
we will prove our results for an arbitrary time stamp t which can be generalized to
all t .4
Dierent from the most dynamic update methodologies, arrow updates specify
which relational arrows are to be kept in the model aer an update. Yet, this spec-
ication is controlled by a set which does not have any semantic closure condition.
Consequently, the relation ×i obtained aer the arrow update is not necessarily S4,
thus may not be a preference relation. en, how can we capture preference updates
∗i using arrow updates and specication sets? is is what we focus on in the sequel.
4
It is important to notice that the time element introduces a second dimension for the epistemic issues
we discuss. Dierent combinations of quantication over histories and time stamps may suggest new
approaches to deletion-based dynamic logics, including sabotage logics (van Benthem, 2005). As such, the
current system can be used to develop extensions of those systems.
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Now, let φ be a distinguishing formula which will control the preference update
for the preference relation i for i . How can we construct an arrow specication set
for this update?
We start by considering the following arrow specication sets for the preference
relation i , distinguished formula φ and agent i:
Arrow(φ, i ) :={(¬φ, i,>), (>, i,φ)}
StrongArrow(φ, i ) :={(¬φ, i,φ)}
Both “Arrow” and “StrongArrow” approximate the updated relation ∗i . We denote the
corresponding updated preference relations as “×i [Arrow]” and “
×
i [StrongArrow]”,
respectively.
eorem 5.1. For a given preference relation i in a HBPL* model M , let ∗i be the
updated preference relation with respect to the distinguishing formula φ. en,
×i [StrongArrow] ⊆ 
∗
i ⊆ 
×
i [Arrow].
Proof. Let (H ,H ′) ∈ i .
Assume that (H ,H ′) ∈ ×i [StrongArrow]. erefore, for any t , we have H , t |= ¬φ
and H ′, t |= φ. en, by denition, (H ,H ′) ∈ ∗i . us, 
×
i [StrongArrow] ⊆ 
∗
i
Now, assume that (H ,H ′) ∈ ∗i . us, either H , t |= ¬φ or H
′, t |= φ for any t . For
the prior case, there is a tuple (¬φ, i,>) ∈ Arrow(φ, i ) so that (H ,H
′) ∈ ×i . For the
laer case, similarly, there exists a tuple (>, i,φ) ∈ Arrow(φ, i ) so that (H ,H
′) ∈ ×i .
Hence, ∗i ⊆ 
×
i [Arrow]. 
Furthermore, we observe that the relation ×i [Arrow] is S4. is is important
because, independent from its relation to ∗i , it suggests a way to construct an S4
arrow update with an explicit arrow specication set. Later on, we will make the
connection between ∗i and 
×
i [Arrow] more precise.
Proposition 5.2. e relation ×i [Arrow] is reexive and transitive.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary history H at t . If H , t |= φ, then (H ,H ) ∈ ×i [Arrow]
since there is a specication (>, i,φ) ∈ Arrow(φ, i ). Otherwise, if H , t |= ¬φ, then
we still have (H ,H ) ∈ ×i [Arrow] as there is a specication (¬φ, i,>) ∈ Arrow(φ, i ).
In each case, ×i [Arrow] is reexive.
To prove transitivity, take (H ,H ′) ∈ ×i [Arrow] and (H
′,H ′′) ∈ ×i [Arrow]. ere
are four possibilities for the tuples H ,H ′ and H ′,H ′′ depending on their arrow speci-
cation:
(i) H , t |= ¬φ and H ′, t |= > H ′, t |= ¬φ and H ′′, t |= >
(ii) H , t |= ¬φ and H ′, t |= > H ′, t |= > and H ′′, t |= φ
(iii) H , t |= > and H ′, t |= φ H ′, t |= ¬φ and H ′′, t |= >
(iv) H , t |= > and H ′, t |= φ H ′, t |= > and H ′′, t |= φ
Now, the case (iii) is impossible as we cannot have H ′, t |= φ ∧¬φ. For the remaining
cases, we have (H ,H ′′) ∈ ×i [Arrow]. For the cases (i) and (ii)we use the specication
(¬φ, i,>) whereas for the case (iv) we use (>, i,φ).
us, ×i [Arrow] is reexive and transitive. 
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On the other hand, ×i [StrongArrow] is not reexive.
Proposition 5.3. e relation ×i [StrongArrow] is not reexive.
Proof. We observe that (H ,H ) < ×i [StrongArrow] since we cannot haveH , t |= φ∧¬φ
for any history-time pair H , t . us, ×i [StrongArrow] is not reexive, thus cannot
produce an S4 modality. 
en, the natural question is the connection between and ∗i and 
×
i [Arrow].
eorem 5.4. For a given preference relation i in a HBPL* model M , let ∗i be the
updated preference relation with respect to the distinguishing formula φ. Let ×i [Arrow]
be an arrow-updated preference relation based on the specication set Arrow(φ, i ) =
{(¬φ, i,>), (>, i,φ)} for the preference relation ∗i .
en, ∗i = 
×
i [Arrow].
Proof. We only need to show that ×i [Arrow] ⊆ 
∗
i .
Let (H ,H ′) ∈ ×i [Arrow] be an arbitrary tuple. en, there exists an arrow update
specication tuple (α , i, β) ∈ Arrow(φ, i ) such that H , t |= α and H
′, t |= β for any
t . ere are only two possibilities for the arrow specication in Arrow(φ, i ): either
(α , i, β) = (¬φ, i,>) or (α , i, β) = (>, i,φ).
In the former case, we have H , t |= ¬φ and H ′, t |= > for any t . Hence, by def-
inition, (H ,H ′) ∈ ∗i . In the laer case, we have H , t |= > and H
′, t |= φ for any
t . Hence, by denition, (H ,H ′) ∈ ∗i . In either case, we have the desired result:
×i [Arrow] ⊆ 
∗
i .
us, ∗i = 
×
i [Arrow]. 
e above theorem illustrates how it is possible to recover the update methodology
of HBPL* using that of AUL by paying special aention to the arrow specications
and restricting them to specic sets.
So far, we have discussed the relational aspects of arrow updates, particularly the
way that AUL manipulates the relations. Next, we discuss how the semantics for the
arrow updates can be given in history based models. For a specication set U , the
arrow update modality [U ] can be dened in HBPL* as follows.
H , t |=M [U ]φ i H , t |=M×U φ
is denition species what remains to be true aer an arrow update using a
given specication set U . Depending on the syntactic complexity of φ, it is possible
to internalize the update using the axioms of AUL.
e axioms of AUL introduce reduction axioms for the dynamic modality [U ] and
are built on the axioms of classical unimodal logic. In what follows, we only give the
axioms governing the arrow update modality where p ∈ P .
• [U ]p ↔ p
• [U ]¬φ ↔ ¬[U ]φ
• [U ](φ ∧ψ ) ↔ ([U ]φ ∧ [U ]ψ )
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• [U ](φ ∨ψ ) ↔ ([U ]φ ∨ [U ]ψ )
• [U ]Kiφ ↔
∧
(ψ ,i, χ )∈U (ψ → Ki (χ → [U ]φ))
It is a straightforward exercise to see the soundness of these axioms in history
based arrow update models M × U in a similar way we have done for HBPL*. We
leave it to the reader
5
. erefore, these axioms are sound for HBPL*.
Now, we observe that from a given HBPL* model, we can obtain the same updated
model using both arrow-updates and dynamic preference updates.
eorem 5.5. LetM = (E,H ,A, {Ei }i ∈A, {λi }i ∈A, {i }i ∈A,V ) be a given HBPL* model
and φ be a formula.
en,M!φ = M × Arrow(φ, i ) where Arrow(φ, i ) = {(¬φ, i,>), (>, i,φ)}.
Proof. Follows immediately based on eorem 5.4. 
Arrow updates oer alternative methods to update preferences. For example, con-
secutive arrow updates can be composed and the same methodology can be carried
over to preference updates via arrow updates. Let U and U ′ be two sets of arrow up-
date specications. e composition of U with U ′, denoted by U ◦ U ′, is dened as
follows (Kooi & Renne, 2011).
Denition 5.6. For two arrow update specicationsU andU ′, the compositionU ◦U ′
is dened as follows:
U ◦U ′ := {(φ ∧ [U ]φ ′, i,ψ ∧ [U ]ψ ′) : (φ, i,ψ ) ∈ U , (φ ′, i,ψ ′) ∈ U ′}
Composing arrow updates can be handy. e following axiom of AUL describes
how it can be achieved [ibid]:
• [U ][U ′]φ ↔ [U ◦U ′]φ
However, composing the individual elements of an arrow update specication set
does not necessarily produce the arrow specication set for a preference update.
Example 5.7. LetU = {(¬φ, i,>)} andU ′ = {(>, i,φ, )}, separating the specication
set Arrow(φ, i ). en, U ◦ U
′ , Arrow(φ, i ) and U
′ ◦ U , Arrow(φ, i ). us,
neither U ◦U ′ nor U ′ ◦U is equivalent to i for the distinguishing formula φ.
In conclusion, the preference updates of HBPL* cannot be achieved by two con-
secutive arrow updates specied by U and U ′.
Composing certain arrow update specications allows us to dene consecutive
updates. Let us see how it works.
Given a preference relation i , let φ be the distinguishing formula to obtain the
updated relation ∗i , and ψ be the distinguishing formula to obtain the updated rela-
tion ∗∗i from 
∗
i . How can we then characterize the update from i to 
∗∗
i using both
approaches?
5
We refer the reader to (Moss, 2015) for a general overview of reduction algorithms in dynamic epistemic
logic.
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In order to apply eorem 5.1, we start by dening the following arrow specica-
tion sets:
Arrow(φ, i ) ={(¬φ, i,>), (>, i,φ)}
Arrow(ψ , ∗i ) ={(¬ψ , i,>), (>, i,ψ )}
eorem 5.1 shows that Arrow(φ, i ) and Arrow(ψ , 
∗
i ) describe the preference up-
dates using the arrow update logic methodology. erefore, the update i
[φ !]
−−→∗i
[ψ !]
−−→∗∗i
can be characterized by the composition [Arrow(ψ , ∗i ) ◦ Arrow(φ, i )]:
[ψ !][φ!]χ ↔ [Arrow(ψ , ∗i ) ◦ Arrow(φ, i )]χ .
e proof of the above claim follows directly from the denitions and eorem 5.5.
We leave it to the reader.
5.2 Product Updates: Histories versus Possible Worlds
An interesting strategy to incorporate Kripke models into history based models is to
combine histories/events with states or possible worlds. is approach generates a
cartesian product of histories and states, producing a complex and expressive system.
If histories are thought of expressing sequences of events taking place over time,
then states can be thought of describing them over space. eir cartesian product,
therefore, describes how histories develop over time and space. is provides his-
tories with extensionality. Such an approach expands the applicability of our logical
toolkit to a broader set of games. Furthermore, product updates with histories enables
us to express game states independent of history-time pairs. As such, the way that
game states and history-time pairs are associated (which is the product-update con-
struction) allows us to reason in and about games from a richer dynamic epistemic
framework. Furthermore, from a technical angle, action/product models in dynamic
epistemic logic were dened using single events (Baltag et al., 1998). In what follows,
we also extend this approach to histories, perceived as sequences of events, suggesting
a multi-event based multi-agent system. erefore, product updates naturally extend
event models to history models. From a philosophical angle, this allows us to reason
about games beyond single actions and moves and focus on game theoretical behav-
ior, expressed as histories. Product updates of worlds and history-time pairs bring us
closer to this goal.
For the completeness of our treatment, let us recall how Kripke models are de-
ned. A Kripke model K is a tuple K = (W ,R,V ) where W is a non-empty set of
states/worlds, R is a binary relation dened on W and V : P 7→ ℘(W ) is a valuation
function. In this model, the relation R is a preference relation on the states where
wRv means that the state v is preferable to w . It is possible to perceive R as another
preference relation or a universal and objective preference ranging over states. We
denote the modality associated with R by ^. e ^ modality will denote the prefer-
ences both in the language of the Kripke models and the history models. It will be
clear from the context in which system it is used. We denote the unimodal language
with the ^ byL^ . Similarly, the updated preference relation R
∗
is dened as expected
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in Kripke models: R∗ = R − {(v,v ′) : K ,v |= φ and K ,v ′ |= ¬φ} for a certain φ which
is used to update the model. e update model K !φ will have the same domain and
valuation. By a slight abuse of notation, the formula [φ!] will denote the preference
update by the formula φ.
Let us now describe how to incorporate Kripke models into HBPL* to dene (pref-
erential) product updates (Gerbrandy, 1999; van Ditmarsch et al., 2007). First, for a
given HBPL* model M , we dene a precondition function pre which assigns a precon-
dition formula in L^ to history-time tuples (h, t). Since pre is a function, there is a
precondition formula for each history-time tuple. From a technical perspective, pre
will allow us to take the product of history-time pairs and Kripke worlds: the prod-
uct tuple (w ;h, t) of a world w and history-time pair (h, t) will exists if and only if
w |=K pre(h, t). For clarity in reading, we write (w ;h, t) for the product of Kripke
state w and the history-time tuple h, t . Now, we dene the product update models as
follows.
Denition 5.8. Given a HBPL* model M and a Kripke model K , the product update
model M × K is dened as follows:
• e domain is {(w ;h, t) : w is a world in K ,h is a history in M andw |=K pre(h, t) for some t},
• e new preference relationR over state/history-time pairs (w ;h, t)R(w
′
;h′, t)
is satised if and only if wRw ′ and h  h′ for some xed time t ;
• e new epistemic relation R∼ over state/history-time pairs(w ;h, t)R∼(w
′
;h′, t)
is satised if and only if wRw ′ and h∼h′ for some xed time t ;
• e new temporal relation R+ over state/history-time pairs(w ;h, t)R+(w
′
;h, t ′)
is satised if and only if wRw ′ and t ′ = t + 1 for some xed history h;
• e product-state (w ;h, t) satises propositional atomp ∈ P if and onlyw |=K p.
In order to keep the technical details at a minimum, the denition above was
given for a single agent, and it can be extended to a multi-agent seing using stan-
dard methods. Furthermore, the additional relations R , R∼ and R+ dened for the
product model can also be associated to box-like modal operators [R], [R∼] and [R+],
respectively. In order to keep technical details at a minimum, we skip such details.
e product update in our system is controlled by a new dynamic modality 〈M ;h, t〉.
e semantic of the product update modality is given as follows.
w |=K 〈M ;h, t〉φ i w |=K pre(h, t) implies (w ;h, t) |=M×K φ
Notice that for those history-time (h′, t ′) pairs where (w ;h′, t ′) is not dened (that
is, where w 6 |=K pre(h′, t ′)), the formula 〈M ;h′, t ′〉φ always holds vacuously at w for
any φ.
e completeness of product update of history based models can be proved im-
mediately using the standard methods presented in (Baltag et al., 1998). e standard
approach reduces the syntax of product models to that of HBPL. For the completeness
of our treatment, let us give the term reduction{ inductively as follows.
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• 〈M ;h, t〉p { pre(h, t) → p
• 〈M ;h, t〉¬φ { pre(h, t) → ¬〈M ;h, t〉φ
• 〈M ;h, t〉(φ ∧ψ ) { pre(h, t)φ ∧ pre(h, t)ψ
• 〈M ;h, t〉(φ ∨ψ ) { pre(h, t)φ ∨ pre(h, t)ψ
• 〈M ;h, t〉[R]φ { pre(h, t) →
∧
{[R∼]〈M ;k, t〉φ : h  k}
• 〈M ;h, t〉[R∼]φ { pre(h, t) →
∧
{[R∼]〈M ;k, t〉φ : h ∼ k}
• 〈M ;h, t〉[R+]φ { pre(h, t) →
∧
{[R∼]〈M ;h, t
′〉φ : t ′ = t + 1}
Briey, let us see how the term reduction { works for the propositional case.
Consider w |=K 〈M ;h, t〉p at a state w for a propositional variable p. en, by deni-
tion we have thatw |=K pre(h, t) implies (w ;h, t) |=M×K p. By the construction of the
product model, the product state (w ;h, t) satises a formula if it is constructed by the
method we gave in Denition 5.8. us, ifw |= pre(h, t), then, again by Denition 5.8,
w |= p. erefore, the reduction function{ translates 〈M ;h, t〉p to pre(h, t) → p. e
other cases can be shown similarly.
Next, we observe whether various properties of history based models are pre-
served in the product models.
Lemma 5.9. History based product models satisfy epistemic perfect recall and prefer-
ential perfectness.
Proof. We present a proof only for the case for epistemic perfect recall, as the proofs
for the other cases are similar.
Epistemic perfect recall is dened by the formula [R∼][R+]φ → [R+][R∼]φ. As
we have demonstrated earlier, this property is valid in history based models. In
order to show that it is also valid in history based product models, we start by as-
suming (w ;h, t) |= [R∼][R+]φ at an arbitrary product state (w ;h, t) and a formula φ.
en, by denition, for all product tuples (w ′;h′, t) with wRw ′ and h∼ih
′
, we have
(w ′;h′, t) |= [R+]φ. Consequently, for all product tuples (w
′′
;h′, t + 1) with w ′Rw ′′,
we have (w ′′;h′, t + 1) |= φ. Now, by denition, since we have w ′Rw ′′ and h∼ih
′
, we
conclude that (w ′;h, t + 1) |= [R∼]φ. Similarly, since wRw
′
, we can take another step
back to deduce (w ;h, t) |= [R+][R∼]φ. us, (w ;h, t) |= [R∼][R+]φ → [R+][R∼]φ for an
arbitrary product state (w ;h, t).
e proof for preferential perfectness (which is dened by the formula [R][R+]φ →
[R+][R]φ) is similar, thus skipped. 
Product updates are sometimes labeled as the “most powerful epistemic update
calculus” (van Benthem & Liu, 2007). Now, we will take advantage of this powerful
tool to illustrate various game theoretical situations in our model.
One of our motivations for introducing preferential product updates over histo-
ries is to express various game theoretical situations and notions such as “delayed
gratication” (that is the “marshmallow test”), “temptation” and “self-control”. e
phenomenon of delayed gratication occurs as people tend to prefer good things
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one two
R
eat wait.eat.eat

one, eat
two,wait.eat.eat
R
one, eat
Figure 2: e Kripke (upper-le), the History Based (upper-right) Models; their Product
(lower-le), and nally the Updated Product Models.
now to beer things later. e marshmallow test is a well-known example for this
phenomenon.
6
In this test, children are found to fail at delaying gratication - they
choose to have one marshmallow now, rather than waiting for a lile while to get an
additional marshmallow. Not waiting for a beer outcome suggests that the agents’
preferences change aer a certain time - they rush now and update their preferences
and violate their rational commitments. Product updates are ideal candidates to model
this situation as they will include states to express the worlds with one and two marsh-
mallows, histories to denote the events of waiting and eating, and a dynamic prefer-
ence update operator to characterize the preference change, which triggers the agent
to have one marshmallow now rather than waiting for the second.
Let us set up the model. e state one is the state where there is one marshmallow
on the plate and two is the state where there are two. Naturally, we have oneRtwo.
We also assume that the players rationally prefer to have a marshmallow later. at
is eat  wait.eat.eat, denoting that the agent prefers to have two marshmallow by
waiting. e preconditions pre for the histories are given as follows: pre(eat, 0) = irr
and pre(wait.eat.eat, 1) = rat where irr and rat are propositional formulas, indicating
that it is irrational to eat the marshmallow now without waiting and it is rational to
wait and then eat more, respectively. Similarly, we have one |= irr and two |= rat .
What happens is, contrary to their game theoretical and rational commitments, the
agents update their preferences to have the irrational choice.
However, these two situations are described in dierent models: one in a Kripke
model and the other one in a history based model. e natural question is how to
combine them into a single model to express the two-dimensions of preferences: one
over the quantities of marshmallow and the other over the histories. is is what our
product update achieves.
Let us now see how the failure of the delayed gratication phenomenon can be
described by a product update. We have two states one and two, and two histories
6
See a relevant video at youtu.be/QX oy9614HQ, and the Wikipedia entry at (en.
wikipedia.org/wiki/Stanford marshmallow experiment).
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wait and wait.eat.eat, as we mentioned earlier. e proposition irr is satised at both
the world one and the history-time pair eat, 0 at time 0; and similarly, rat is satised
at both two and wait.eat.eat, 1. Similarly, we have oneRtwo and eat  wait.eat.eat,
yielding the product preference R as follows, with a slight abuse of notation (See
Figure 2):
(one; eat, 0) R (two;wait.eat.eat, 1)
e product update combines the worlds with histories, respecting the proposi-
tional valuations. Yet, as such, it does not express the preference updates. For this,
we will use the [·!] operator of HBPL* in order to expresses the breaking point of the
agent’s preference, yielding a rushed preference over one marshmallow with a shorter
history.
e rst task is to determine the distinguishing formula which triggers the pref-
erence update over world-history pairs. e distinguishing formula is irr which sym-
bolizes that the agent suddenly prioritizes being irrational and rushes to having one
marshmallow. Notice that irr is only satised at one and eat, 0.
e phenomenon of the marshmallow test, thus, is expressed as follows
one, eat |= 〈M ; eat, 0〉[irr !]noDGC
where the formula noDGC represents the choice induced by the failure of delayed
gratication phenomenon – eating the marshmallow now.
Our framework allows various generalizations of the marshmallow test, enrich-
ing the discussions regarding the game theoretical interpretation of the phenomenon.
One way is to consider a version of the marshmallow test which takes place in the
future. In this version, agents are given two choices: one marshmallow at time t
in the future or two marshmallows at time t + k . In this case, it can be thought that
people may favor waiting rather than rushing to having one marshmallow. is hypo-
thetical case contrasts itself very clearly with the original test where the comparison
is between now and some time in the future. Another generalization is the case of
multiple states with n marshmallows incremented by one at each step. e test of
n-marshmallows can be used to identify the cuing-point of where agents give up
waiting for more. Our framework can easily express such cases. Such generaliza-
tions allow us to consider the interaction between the next-time modality © and the
dynamic modalities [·!] and 〈M ;h, t〉 in order to have a more nuanced description of
the phenomenon of delayed gratication together with its potential extensions and
generalizations.
In conclusion, product updates for history based models achieve the following.
First, from a technical angle, they extend event-based product models to history-based
models, allowing us to experiment with sequences of events and their temporal and
epistemic qualities. Second, they incorporate possible worlds into history based mod-
els, suggesting a rich area of applications. As we exemplied, the additional formalism
becomes necessary to characterize various interesting game theoretical situations.
5.3 Further Approaches to Dynamic Model Updates
e preference update we have introduced forms the basis of further work reported
in (Anderson et al., 2016), which introduces a logic for reasoning about uncertain
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preferences. In that work, history based preference models are extended with sets
of preference relations for each agent. A corresponding preference update is dened
using a set of distinguishing formulae: this update accounts for a change that alters
preferences in an uncertain manner. e leading example is (lack of) compliance with
newly introduced policies. Agents may have a limited appetite for complying with
policies which run counter to their original preferences. e introduction of such a
policy will amend the agents’ preferences, but the extent to which they will update
their decision making is uncertain, so a set of possible new preferences is generated.
(Anderson et al., 2016)’s work is still at a preliminary stage of development: the
syntax and semantics of the logic are presented but no proof system or metatheory are
developed. Nevertheless this work provides a starting point for an analysis of decision
making under uncertainty, or incomplete information reasoning, using history based
preference models.
6 Comparison with Other Work
e original work that initiated history based models aims at analyzing the epis-
temic role of messages (Parikh & Ramanujam, 2003). e authors then briey dis-
cuss Gricean implicatures, motivated by various Wigensteinian issues. e mes-
sages themselves and the way they were dened using histories strongly resembles
signaling games. It would not be wrong to claim that the authors have come close
to game theoretical concepts, but have not taken the next step. e current paper
therefore can be seen as an investigation towards the direction that was implicitly
addressed in (Parikh & Ramanujam, 2003).
As we argued, there is an explicit connection between program runs and histories
(Pacuit, 2007). Pacuit addressed this relation and showed how histories and runs (in
interpreted systems) can be converted to each other. Even if Pacuit himself pointed
out a potential game theoretical application of history based models, a clear idea or an
application of games with histories was lacking. is motivated our work for intro-
ducing preferences to express subjective and game theoretical agency. Clearly, there
is further work to be done. A quantitative and utility-based analysis using histories
remains to be developed.
A brief discussion of dynamic epistemic and temporal logic goes beyond the scope
of this paper. ese two frameworks were unied in various ways, almost uniformly
using Kripke models (van Benthem et al., 2007). Epistemic-temporal logics are well-
studied. It remains, however, to investigate how dierent systems may help us un-
derstand the dynamic interaction between the two as well as how epistemic-temporal
modalities become useful in fundamental game theoretical analysis. e current paper
aempts at contributing to lling in this gap in the literature.
e literature on interpreted systems is rich (Halpern et al., 2004; Fagin et al.,
1995; Fagin et al., 1991; Fagin et al., 1999). It has clear applications in computing and
program analysis, which are the underlying motivation for such models. A run of
a program can easily be seen as a history with a clear temporal element. From this
perspective, introducing subjective preferences into interpreted systems may pave the
way towards a broader class of applications in system analysis, human-computer in-
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teraction and articial intelligence where programs (and their runs) need to interact
with humans with subjective preferences. Such game-like situations require frame-
works with preferences, knowledge, temporality and some other similar modalities.
Our logic suggests an ideal framework for this direction. Moreover, from a philosoph-
ical perspective, it suggests the possibility of introducing preferences into computa-
tion. is has the potential to lead to a broader conceptualization of programs, runs
and computation.
Modal logical treatment of preferences constitutes a broad literature (Hanson,
2001). A dynamic treatment of preferences was initiated relatively earlier using Krip-
kean structures (van Benthem & Liu, 2007; van Benthem et al., 2009). Nevertheless, the
structural dierences of the update models over dierent models and semantics have
not been adequately addressed (van Benthem, 2014). e current paper can therefore
be seen as a contribution for this issue. Furthermore, the state based approach to pref-
erences provides a single-shot picture of the situation. As such it fails to portray an
evolutionary description of preferences. estions such as “which actions yield what
preference?” and “how do preferences evolve over time?” are le unanswered. His-
tory based models, however, can identify the sequences of actions (that is “histories”)
that bring about certain preferences. From a game theoretical perspective, this is an
important distinction.
Action models, on the other hand, suggest a very powerful way to combine indi-
vidual actions with Kripke models and they can easily be extended to produce product
models with multiple actions (Baltag et al., 1998). Our extension of action models re-
places individual actions in the syntactic structure of the model with a sequence of
histories, providing a richer and fuller picture. is suggests an immediate applica-
tion both for action and history models, as we have demonstrated. What remains
to be done is to use action based models for epistemic game theory, where moves
are considered as actions and the epistemic/temporal aspects are used to dene game
theoretical equilibria and rationality. Our work can be viewed as a rst step towards
this direction, where game equilibria can be discussed within our framework.
A recent work on action models extend action models with temporal and epistemic
operators (Renne et al., 2016). eir model, however, is based on Kripke models and
uses single-shot action models. It also lacks a clear game theoretical motivation and
applicability. e current work aims at motivating further work on other epistemic
and temporal systems and their applicability to game theory.
Another interesting direction is to study the epistemic and temporal aspects of
blockchain protocols using interpreted systems or history based models (Halpern &
Pass, 2017). Blockchain protocols are gaining increasing aention and present an
intriguing direction for epistemic and temporal logics. It is a maer of interesting de-
bate how preferences would t in that framework and how agents may have dierent
incentives to deviate from the public ledgers of the blockchain protocol. Our work
seems to provide the necessary framework for such inquiries.
e logic HBPL* lacks any methodology to deal with strategies. is is a valid
criticism and can be viewed as a design choice. e literature abounds for logics for
strategies (Lorini & Moisan, 2011; Ramanujam & Simon, 2008; Başkent, 2011). Our
contribution complements this body of work by focusing on preferences rather than
strategies. An immediate future work would be to combine them into a unied struc-
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ture which is expressive enough to describe preferences, game theoretical rationality
and strategic reasoning.
7 Conclusion
History based structures have long remained understudied. is paper is an aempt
to change this.
We have presented a history based model to reason about changing preferences,
with a clear motivation from game theory. Consequently, we have studied how our
framework relates to various other well-studied systems in dynamic epistemic logic.
is highlights the potential of history based models both in epistemic and game the-
oretical situations.
What our system lacks is an explicit and detailed study of “time”. In our approach,
we used time as a mere tracking device or an indicator. It is however possible to use it
the way it is instrumentalized in linear temporal logics, with a broader modal toolkit
to express more complex situations including indenite past and future. is creates
possible new directions for future work.
Another line of research to extend HBPL* is to consider its modal extensions
with deontic and common-knowledge modalities. Such an extension would allow
expressing interesting situations where the agents’ obligations depend on their past
and knowledge, allowing another approach to the “can-ought” problem.
In this paper, we did not take advantage of our system to formalize other game
theoretical concepts including strategies and Nash equilibrium. ey fall outside the
scope of the current paper, yet present future work possibilities.
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Appendix: An Alternative Method to Dene the Re-
duction Function t
In what follows, we present an alternative method the dene the reduction function
t discussed in the proof of Lemma 4.3.
We dene a translation function t as follows
t(p) = p
t(¬φ) = ¬t(φ)
t(φ ∧ψ ) = t(φ) ∧ t(ψ )
t(φ ∨ψ ) = t(φ) ∨ t(ψ )
t(Kiφ) = Kit(φ)
t(^iφ) = ^it(φ)
t(©φ) = ©t(φ)
t(φUψ ) = t(φ)Ut(ψ )
For update free formulas φ,ψ , we dene a function T as
t([φ!]ψ ) := T ([t(φ)!]t(ψ ))
where T is dened on [φ!]ψ for update-free formulas in the following
T ([φ!]p) = p
T ([φ!]¬ψ ) = ¬T ([φ!]ψ )
T ([φ!](ψ ∧ χ )) = T ([φ!]ψ ) ∧T ([φ!]χ )
T ([φ!](ψ ∨ χ )) = T ([φ!]ψ ) ∨T ([φ!]χ )
T ([φ!]Kiψ ) = KiT ([φ!]ψ )
T ([φ!]©ψ ) = ©T ([φ!]ψ )
T ([φ!](ψU χ )) = (T ([φ!]ψ ))U (T ([φ!]χ ))
T ([φ!]^iψ ) = (¬φ ∧ ^iT ([φ!]ψ )) ∨ (^i (φ ∧T ([φ!]ψ ))).
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It is a straight-forward procedural argument to see that t indeed reduces formulas
in the language of HBPL* to update-free formulas.
Let us prove it for the formula [φ!][ψ !]χ . By denition we have t([φ!][ψ !]χ ) =
T ([t(φ)!]t([ψ !]χ )). By induction hypothesis, t(φ) and t([ψ !]χ ) are update-free. en,
T becomes applicable. By induction for T with the update-free formula t([ψ !]χ ), it
follows that T ([t(φ)!]t([ψ !]χ )) is update-free.
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